



**Challenge**  
*The Changing Landscape of European (In)security*

## **WP 2 Deliverable – December 2005**

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### **Mapping the European Union field of the professionals of security**

*A methodological note on the problematique*

This document is the synthesis report of two seminars organized in Sciences Po on October 10, 2005 and November 9, 2005.

## ***Fist Part : The problematique of the field of security***

The first eighteen month have been dedicated to empirical research concerning antiterrorist activities done by police organisations, intelligence services, military personnel in France, Spain and UK at the national level and at the level of the EU institutions (Bigo, Bonelli, Guittet). We have also investigated the relationships and the porous boundaries between the professionals of security, the professionals of politics and the professionals of the media, as well as the relations between the public bureaucracies and the private security industry working on exchange of information through data bases and developing biometrics identifiers (Tsoukala, Olsson, Hanon). Complementary research done in Sciences-Po has also investigated the role of magistrates in the EU (Megie) and research has been carried on at the geographic level exploring the transatlantic relations (Bonditti), and the neighbouring relations (Jeandesboz).

The project was to gather enough material to test the hypothesis of a European field of professionals of security linking the different services of law enforcement authorities, customs, intelligence and secret services in such a way that the professional solidarity between these services (and sometimes private agencies) gives birth, beyond the struggles, to a general common sense concerning what is and what is not “security”; common sense accepted and reinforced by the professionals of politics and of media; common sense often stronger than the national politics of the different governments and even of some nationalistic attitudes.

The core of the investigation was to assess the impact of antiterrorist activities and legislation after 2001 in the European Union on struggle against crime, corruption, money laundering, and also on other illegal activities, including migration. Additional research has been launched to specify how far the struggle against terrorism impacts or not on the other legislations, including the rights of foreigners to access to the territory of the EU and to seek asylum, or the right to a private life for IT users, towards more exceptions or administrative derogation facilitating the autonomy of the government and its bureaucracies regarding the Rule of Law (issue of the journal *Cultures & Conflits: suspicion and exception*<sup>1</sup>).

### **The Notion of field of professionals of security**

As Didier Bigo has analyzed in his book *Police in Networks, the European experiment*, as well as in several articles, a conglomerate or an archipelago of networks of bureaucracies working at the

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<sup>1</sup> Suspicion et exception, *Cultures & Conflits*, n°58, 2/2005.

transnational level is not always a “field”. It may only be an interaction between different sectors or different activities of social and professional lives which just interact from time to time. But to use the notion of field goes beyond the the description of an archipelago of bureaucracies in networks. A field should be defined minimally in terms of four dimensions: first, the field as a field of force, or a magnetic field, a field of attraction that polarizes around the specific stakes of the agents involved; second, the field as a field of struggle, or a battle-field, that is able to understand the “colonizing” activities of various agents, the defensive retreats of others, and the various kinds of tactical algorithms that organize bureaucratic struggles ; third, the field as field of domination or subordination vis-à-vis another field, the field as a positioning inside a larger political and social space permitting the possibility of statements making truth claims on the basis of knowledge and know-how; and fourth, the field as a transversal field, whose own trajectory reconfigures social universes that were formerly autonomous and shifts the borders of these former realms to include them totally or partially in the new field. Exemplifying this in the case of security there is a shift that reconfigures certain police and military *métiers* as well as the intermediary *métiers* that follow upon the de-differentiation of internal and external through the practices of violence and technologies of identification and surveillance.

So, if we are to attempt a preliminary definition of the field of security professionals, we would begin by saying that the field depends less on the real possibility of exerting force as in the classical sociological accounts of Hobbes or Weber, where the field would be defined purely as a function of coercion or power to kill, to decide upon life and death. It rather depends on the capacity of the agents to produce statements on fear and unease and present solutions to facilitate the management of unease and the feeling to be protected or not, to live or not in a secure world. It structures a social space linking all the institutions regulating the life of the population in the name of protection and the institutions which can use legitimately the threat to kill and the power to control survival. This social space of the place where these institutions stand can be correlated with the social space of their standpoints about security and insecurity.

The institutions involved in the field are traditionally state bureaucracies, using a specific reference to a collective identity, either, local, national or/and federal. They can use technologies of surveillance and control in the name of the survival or/and the protection of the individual, even to coerce him. They are considered, in a democracy, as the guarantees that the state is fulfilling its duties concerning security (defence and law and order). But this traditional account needs to be complemented by the multiplication of private institutions dealing with risk, insurance, individual protection, exchange of information, elaboration of profiles, market oriented companies and bureaucracies selling technologies of security, including sometimes the capacity and the know-how about to kill as the private military companies. The position of each agent is correlated with the amount of “capital” they have and with the capacity to convert one form of capital into another one. It may be economic capital, social and relational capital, cultural capital, or symbolic capital as bearer of authority concerning a specific

knowledge or know-how. This last form of capital is the most important inside the field of in-security and privileges the public bureaucracies and its agents, but the privatisation of a range of security issues increasingly allows for a conversion of economic capital as a useful resource in the competition to assess who and what is a danger, to have authoritative judgements about unease.

The seniority inside the field and the link with the professional of politics are also important criteria to understand who has authority (and legitimacy), but the effective capacity at the technological level to fight against a specific form of violence, and the relation to the media and the public are also alternative way to produce authoritative statements, and it is often the strategy of the newcomers willing to enter into the field or of the pretenders inside the field. The *hegemony* of the (in)security discourse as a governmentality basis for shifting the focus away from socio-economic and socio-political change is then one of the strongest effect of the field of the professionals of security over the society (Lianos).

The distribution of different forms of capital between the agents, especially between the symbolic capital of know how and recognition of a legitimate authority to use violence and to manage life on one side and the economic capital, the strength of the market oriented vision of risk, and the argument of efficiency linked with a cost analysis, organises the field.

The social space constituted by the web of institutions dealing with security is then both public and private, nationalist and market oriented. The distribution between these characteristics gives us for each institution its position with regard to the others, and very often an indication of its seniority into the field: public institutions linked to the threat to kill, having for them to have centuries of existence in comparison to some private institutions dealing with risk management.

This approach using the notion of 'field' of professionals re-unites what was often seen as two different universes, centrally different, one dealing with internal security or law and order and the other as external security or defence. The field then brings together all those who, in the name of security, manage technologies of coercion, control and surveillance and those who produce narratives whose goal is to tell us who and what should inspire us fear and unease, as opposed to what is only destiny, fate, impossible to avoid. It also depends on the capacity of the professionals and of their techniques to conduct their research into this unfolding body of statements at a routine level, to develop correlations, profiles, and to classify all those that it is necessary to identify and place under surveillance. Thus the agents of the field of in-security, despite their apparent diversity, can be defined as professionals of the management of threat/protection or unease/safety, producers of power-knowledge on the couplet security/insecurity.

## **What does an analysis in terms of field means?**

A relational approach of the social space in terms of field differs from classical network theory which involves free agents and quasi infinite expansion of the network. It is opposed to an approach in terms

of agents' consciousness and in terms of a rational individualist and utilitarian approach. Here the calculations are not explicit, there is not necessarily a consciousness of the actors, but simply a *sense of the game*, or an "habitus" which is driven by the logic of the practice and not by clear calculations of cost and advantages. It is often this point which is forgotten in some so-called critical views which nevertheless, by supposing clear consciousness, fell into a kind of conspiracy theory, through a lack of critical understanding of the relations, the game or the field constraints. And we strongly opposed these approaches that reduce social life to utilitarian calculations or to an infinite intersubjectivity independent of any social and political power.

The idea of a social space as a field supposes then in the use of the term "social" that a logic of practices is at work, that the agents are not "free" to create by unilateral decisions new boundaries just by acting along a strategy of their own or by a specific discourse (even an authoritative one). They can do that only if these social agents are already inside the field and are the bearers of specific systems of durable and transposable dispositions which fit with the dispositions of the other agents and create a recognition and self obedience between them. It is what is called in mainstream sociology "trust" between the agents. In fact, the social space conforms the habitus of the agents to their objective positions in terms of power.

Thus the field as a social space is formed by the structural homology between two social spheres or spaces: the objective sphere of the differentiated structural positions of the professionals of security which is related with where they "stand", with their amount of capital and their capacity to "secure", and the sphere of their "standpoints", their narratives, of their statement about threat management which is related with their habitus, their intersubjectivity, their logic of practice and their strategies or unwilling side effects of previous decisions.

Finally the field as a social space may be represented as a graph with axis representing the coordinates of the different forms of capital, as a graph of power relations in structural homology with a graph whose axis are representing the various forms of discourses. The structure of their positions is homologous with their standpoint. "One can, at this point in the discussion, compare the social space to a geographical space within which regions are divided up. But this space is constructed in such a way that the agents, groups or institutions that find themselves situated in it have more properties in common the closer they are to each other in this space ; and fewer common properties, the further they are away from each other. Spatial distances - on paper - coincide with social distances" says Pierre Bourdieu. But far from permanently awarded positions, agents in the field *knowingly* occupy positions that are subject to significant and sudden changes<sup>2</sup>.

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<sup>2</sup> We will see in more details in another deliverable combining Bigo and Lianos approaches that the Bourdieu approach of the field is far too inattentive of the forms of borders of the field and trapped into the idea of an always strict delimitation between an inside and an outside, what Didier Bigo calls a cylindrical representation of the boundaries and I will plead later on for a different vision of the boundaries which implies to think along the Mobius ribbon analogy where the boundaries are not fixed but intersubjective and then subject to variations about who belongs or not to the field and more important who has authority inside the field to be a spoke person, a legitimate bearer of knowledge and truth. See also Walker.

## The geographical and functional boundaries of the field and the question of autonomy

In each case, we had to acknowledge that the boundaries are not rigid and that it is impossible to disconnect a field of antiterrorist activities acting only at the EU level, from other activities and arenas. Antiterrorist activities at the EU level are intermingled with antiterrorist activities at a transatlantic and more global level on one side, and they are also immersed into a more general Internal Security field of activities expanding abroad the EU. This Internal Security field at the European level connects questions of terrorism with organised crime, or/and serious offences (list of the EU core crime of art 5 Europol Convention), with cross border crime, with money laundering and drug trafficking, with mafia activities, with human trafficking, with illegal migration, with religious radicalisation, with asylum seekers, with urban riots (see the Prüm Treaty, see Council declarations on terrorism, see declarations of Ministry of Interior of some of the member states). The Internal Security field is structured by the priorities given to the list of threats and dangers, depending on both their materiality as forms of violence, their visibility at the social level and their importance for the professionals of politics. Its coherence is subject to discussion as the practices of violence and of social changes considered as danger, risk or threat, may be hugely different from the appreciation of the bureaucracies working on the “fight against” these threats. The intensity of the threat, its imminence, its impact on society, are sometimes over-evaluated along the lines of specific interests of the agents for missions and budgets (terrorism, radicalism, role of asylum seekers). Sometimes it may be the contrary (ecological disasters, domestic accidents, car accidents). The interconnection between the threats under more and more ambiguous labels is also subject to caution and needs a careful appreciation. If, some obvious cases of relations between cross border smuggling and terrorism exist, they are quite rare at the statistical level. A constant link between all the threats and by specific and coherent actors has never been proved. Terrorism is not coming from a centralised network call Al-Qaeda, and was never under the direction of the KGB during the Cold war, even if some very specific cases involving Carlos and the RAF has shown that from time to time the KGB played with the phenomenon of political violence by clandestine organisations. Organised crime has nothing to do with a global Cosa Nostra, except in the prolific imagination of Claire Sterling and organised crime is often highly disorganised but nevertheless serious. Illegal migration has nothing to do with state strategy but with thousand of individual decisions. The restriction to one interconnected network of multiple enemies working together is coming more from the fears of the different bureaucracies, duplicated by journalists and some researchers than by evidences. On the contrary, empirical research show the complexity and heterogeneity of forms of violence, the difficulty to summarize them under some labels as terrorism, or drug trafficking, or organised crime, and they often show a tendency in bureaucracies to see any social change as a threat to the existing order (both internal and international). It often favours a conservative policy and a vision structured by law and order, by

coercion, independent from the global ideology of the political party and government in power. The cyclicity of the power/knowledge structure around insecurity and the safety paradox loop has to be analysed (Lianos). And it is probably a promising mapping criterion to classify agents by their handling of the safety paradox loop since counting on the proliferation of dangerising discourses is in many ways the unifying interest of the field. Are agents themselves involved in the production and dissemination of such discourses or are they ‘free-riding’ on discourses produced by others? This distinction between primary and secondary discursive agents could certainly increase the precision of polarising between, for example, “modern” and “traditional” actors, “collective” and “individual” insecurity legitimating bases, or “sovereign” and “globalised” agents.

So, it is difficult to agree with the idea that we have now a global chaos, a global (in)security at the world level which explains all the local events. We have perhaps a globalisation of fears and unease, but we don’t have a clear globalisation of violence at the statistical level. What give the impression of a global violence is first the possibility of a local bombing with NBC to have a global impact. However, this has been discussed for good reasons after September 11, 2001, especially by Graham Allison and his researchers: they have shown that to accept the worst case scenario as a certainty for the future is misleading. The questions are still why and how, not when (against the formula of John Ashcroft). The second element about globalisation is of a different kind. It does not involve one event with global consequences but the idea of an interconnection of the different forms of violence, because they come from mixed bodies coming from some local convergences (guerrilla, clandestine organisations and some mafias working together and becoming one). A generalised discourse about these forms of violence, as well as a discourse that the same means can be used against all of them is now considered as an unchallenged truth, but the discourse is more the common “doxa” of the actors of the field than the proper narrative to describe the transformation of political violence and social changes in the last decade.

A technological fix appears with the idea that gathering information, tracing people on the move, sharing information between agencies of different kind and between different countries, and even of different regimes, is the solution against terrorism, crime and migration. Biometrics identifiers, data bases, technologies of surveillance, and all the practices of policing at a distance are considered as a way to cope better with all these threats than the old logic of protection behind a frontier seen as a defence wall. We see strong disputes between the actors concerning the speed of the move, the efficiency of the new techniques, their compatibility with the old ones, the capacity to do both at the same moment, but it binds even more the idea that the threats are interconnected.

The role of the “mediascape” is central in the propagation of the belief that technology will solve any problem, that coercion and surveillance have a chance to replace political involvement, and general dialogue dealing with inequality, discrimination and injustice. Many media studies have highlighted the fact that most news notices about security problems are structurally biased in favour of official sources and culturally biased in favour of officially sanctioned claims. News on these issues is

then constructed by news media organizations in which a well established beat-system and a norm of professionalism encourage journalists to draw primarily on police sources. The professionals of security become thus one of the key primary definers of all security problems. In this respect, they may be allied to or opposed to other primary definers, going from the government and the judiciary to various more or less significant claims makers. The nature of media-dependent democracies and media-responsive powers has instrumentalised 'public opinion' into an unavoidable, albeit manipulated, tool of legitimacy. This state of affairs redefines the very role of institutional discourses in contemporary capitalist democracies. As a result, it would be naïve to try and position actors in the security field without taking seriously into account their strategies on public opinion (ranging from shunning it altogether, e.g. in controversial technology development<sup>3</sup>, to riskily exploiting it, e.g. in radical declarations regarding new security measures). Wars in the security field often happen *via* communication strategies that target 'public opinion'; such strategies are central to actors having their positions established, consolidated or lost. Expectedly an actor's stance towards public opinion at any one time is a highly reliable categorisation marker. However, the media agenda-setting is shaped by the production processes of news organizations and the structural determinants of news-making, and not only by the professionals of politics and security. The autonomy of the journalists exists and they are fighting for it, but in all the issues where secret is involved and legitimised, they are more subject to dependence from the public authorities, and they have the tendency to accept the framing of the news, even if they are contesting elements. The providers of security are thus increasingly involved in the public definition process of the problems (threat, risk..) to determine as much as possible their framing, i.e. their definition, explanation, moral categorisation and eventual tackling. In many countries, this has led to the establishment of elaborate police communication strategies. These strategies, which may even be defined at the EU level, aim on the one hand at strengthening the legitimising ground of the law enforcement action and, on the other hand, at reassuring the population about the capacity of the authorities to establish law and order. Moreover, as these strategies seek to avoid any downgrading of the law enforcement agencies image, security officials usually provide the media with enough front-region access to satisfy daily story requirements but protect their own interest by limiting access to back regions. In this permanent competition for status on the main agendas of the journalists, the public and policy makers, one should not exclude the specific interests of the media actors themselves, as occasionally they may play the role of the principal claims maker and become primary definers of situation obliging both professionals of politics and of security to answer to questions at a time they would prefer not to speak. The threats analysis is then a complex process involving the brute facts of violence, their impact in everyday life, their political importance, their necessity or not to be tackled, the interests and norms of the professionals of security to recognise

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<sup>3</sup> The secret intelligence services have significantly moved away from shunning public opinion and this represents a change of their position in the field, towards public accountability concerning their efficiency. On the contrary, companies introducing technologies likely to cause controversy are now most discreet, so as not to break their pact with the political system that will handle the discursive aspect.



them as priorities in their agenda, the technologies which can be used and justified by dealing with the violence or the social changes, the interest and role of the journalists to speak about these threats and the concern of the population.

From the researches carry on by the ELISE network and now by Challenge partners, as well as many other researches converging towards the same conclusion, we don't have the emergence of a global and coordinated threat at the world level, and we don't have either a clear world level for the answer. Claims of national sovereignty or even of local competences block the claim to go "global" for a coordinated answer, including all the agencies of all the different states concerned by the same rising threat of global terror. Very often the global answer is seen mainly as the answer of the democratic regimes, leaving open the questions of their way to share sensitive information with authoritarian regimes. The transatlantic dimension, the G8 (plus Australia) are often the fora for organising an internal common security of the area, by homology with Defence. The European level is considered as an easier level of cooperation, but at the same moment, an insufficient level to cope with a "global" threat. The European security field is then seen as a "better" solution for cooperation than no cooperation at all, but cannot gain a complete legitimacy if the threat is global. The efforts to define eurocrime in substance have all been unsuccessful. The argument about a Western and larger solution has been also advocated but the lack of accountability of this level has created a drawback to the European level. The European Union is then seen as a shortcoming for globalisation of security in a specific zone to answer the global insecurity. Many arguments in the debate with the US partners are oscillating between the US as "inside" and "leader" of a coalition for a global security or as an "another" area with specific problems and not really helpful in the solution they propose to cope with the political violence of clandestine organisations ( war at the international level, surveillance at the borders, traceability of people on the move). The European Union has chosen in all these topics a less aggressive behaviour concerning the relations with third world countries. But, at the same moment, they have not been really innovative and have followed the technological fix. They have also preferred to believe that police, armies and intelligence services can deal with the political violence and social changes, and that the real problem was the lack of coordination between them, instead of analysing the necessity of a wider political understanding of the world situation. They have considered that police needs to go beyond borders to anticipate movements of persons and prevent them. They have insisted on better cooperation and the sharing of information between the heads of security and intelligence services in order to have the knowledge to act before any major event of violence. They have asked their military to be prepared for "pre-emptive" actions, even inside their territory. The normal political life has been both "suspended" and "accelerated" in the name of exception and emergency. The routines of judicial debate, of parliamentary life with strong discussions have been singled out as time consuming. We have tried to analyse the development of the climate of suspicion and the development of a justification of the exceptions through more mundane derogations, as well as the development of

what appears as a merging between internal and external aspects of security, but is mainly the development of the internal security of the European Union beyond its own borders (Cultures et Conflits, Conflitti globali).

For many activities, polices are in networks, in contradiction between them and of different scope and depth depending of the missions. They all interact but some networks are small, highly confidential and often sensitive, others are clearly beyond the EU and have the ambition to be transatlantic or even at the world scale. Some are informal others are official and advertised, even if they are not the most effective. For drugs, corruption and money laundering , even if many discourses have been around the Euro counterfeiting, it is quite impossible to specify a distinct European agenda. The agenda seems to follow the G8 one, and even sometimes the UN one. This agenda is also sometimes at the sources of these larger fora. For antiterrorism squads, the exchange of information is pushed by the political agenda, but resistances exist to share sensitive data, regarding sometimes what is considered as relevant for national interests. Here also, the European Union level exists through Europol and the different European police working groups, but the influence of third party such as the US agencies (CIA, State department, FBI, New York police abroad...) and of the new department of Homeland security plays a role on the European debates, even if sometimes a contradictory one. The collaboration between counter-intelligence services is high, but it is not the case for external security services, and even less between magistrates. The automated delivery of information through general agreements has been a point of tension between the US and the EU, and inside the EU between the Council, the Commission and the Parliament. Concerning the involvement of the military in the antiterrorist struggle, the level has been highly differentiated between the different countries, with more activities of the military in the country at war with Iraq. Nevertheless, the tendency to accept that they may have an important role is on its way, even if the legitimacy is weak. Even if the Sitcen is often evoked, the EU second pillar is not homogeneous and Nato is more influential as an international body. Paradoxically, it seems that the EU is more unified when the subject is less correlated with the way to deal with political violence or crime, and is focused on migrants, foreigners, citizen from a foreign origin. Here the different governments, either right wing or left wing, play the same “game” of a symbolic politics pointing at globalisation and the freedom of movement of foreigners (either tourists or migrants or asylum seekers) as the main threat for the stability of the international order and for their own safety. But they differ from the US in the way they want to deal with their neighbours. They try to avoid blocking too much the borders and have chosen to externalise their logics of control to these countries, playing the role of buffers. But, here also, the European Union is not unified and the governments have different projects concerning welcoming migration and respecting the right to be a refugee.

The efforts to coordinate between countries and between agencies the exchange of information and to have a better knowledge about the future of violence behaviour have been important, and have boosted all the security industry about biometrics, data bases, profiling, and any kind of individualised


surveillance. The European Union has some hope that this security complex will be less dependent from the US than the military complex, and is trying to push for cooperation mainly between EU members. It has sometimes the effect to relegate concerns about liberty, privacy and rule of law on the margins of the discussion. Economic competition seems more important and again the best way to create more innovation for an improved world security, because the driving force is the hope to solve violence through an interconnected network of technologies of surveillance and control having the capacity to prevent threats coming from some actors and even some unintended consequences or natural catastrophes by the development of profiles of risks. What is called global or European security is then not exactly security for the individuals living into the European Union but a specific vision of what is security, whose security, who has to be in charge, how to provide protection, at what level. Alternative visions are important to raise some of these questions, and to deepen the reflection. But these alternative visions are possible only, if they are grounded on in-depth research analysing the positions of all the actors, their autonomy, to avoid to blame one actor when it is the result of multiple interactions. It needs to come from an epistemological point of view and a specific methodology of analysis insisting on the transnational character of the collaboration between all the professionals of security, and not from an ideological vision, often naïve, about freedom versus security, or achieving a “right balance” between “so-called” contradictory principles (See UK teams and CEPS meeting of first year of challenge on Hague programme).

The boundaries of the field of the professionals of security are then porous, but exist nevertheless and produce “field effects”. The autonomy of the field is limited by the “upper” world of the professional of politics which can impose some of their labels, which can intervene to reframe or even suppress some of the public or private agencies, but which are dependent from the knowledge of the professionals of the field and which have a vested interests to the competition between them, even when they claim that they want more coordination and that they want to tend towards a coherent and optimally a one single channel of information (total information awareness). It is limited by the “tangential” world of the professionals of media and their relation to the public and to the materiality of violence with the possibility of different prioritisation of risk and threats, and competing agenda, delegitimising the monopoly on what is security and for whom. It is limited by the strategies of the “under” world of some of the professionals of crime, and or professionals of war which can create innovations in their own repertory of actions and also destabilise the routines and the techniques of the professionals of security, creating areas of uncertainty favorising challenges between the professionals about who is the most efficient. But, because of their capacity to enunciate statements about danger, risk and threat and the truth involved in their daily routines, their work, their technologies, their distinct capacity to hold the category of secret, they have a specific authority coming from their professional life. They can challenge the highest authority of the state in the framing of the “real” threat. They can “impose” a consensus about what is and what is not security, what is and what is not


insecurity in the social sphere where they are invested. Of course they encounter resistance from local actors, from dissidents, from the underworld, from the “amateurs” of security. Some powerful actors can convert their symbolic capital into a competition about what is security, for example churches have been major players on the definition of what is peace. Cosmopolitan discourses of various players have threatened the notion of national security as the main stake of the security field. But the transnational web of institutions, especially in the Western world, sharing the same assumptions, the same rules of the game, gives grounds to their capacity of framing the notions of security and insecurity for the public and to limit the debate to an “internal” debate between them about the means, the objectives but not the mere definitions and categories. The “naturalisation” of the notion of terrorism is one of the example of both the struggles between the professionals of security and the doxa that “terrorism” exists per se (Bigo, Guittet, Moucheron).

## Second part : Methodology

The object of this note is to develop a methodology permitting to have nevertheless a better understanding of the role of the EU in these different topics and to differentiate different levels of interaction and processes in order to assess the different agents and the general structure of the field of the professionals of security acting in or influencing Europe.



## Social space of standpoints concerning (in)security



Concerning **the social space of standpoints**, of discourses concerning (in)security, it is possible to organise it along two orthogonal axes :

- 1) the horizontal one is related to the *referent object of security* inside the discourse, and differentiate between **individual security and collective** security.
- 2) the vertical one is related also to the referent object of security, and differentiate between dangers and threats concerning a space enclosed by boundaries, a **territory** to defend or dangers and threats concerning a group of **population** to put under surveillance.

In the horizontal axis, individual security is related to personal security or safety, to fear of crime and feeling of insecurity, to unease concerning misery, unemployment, poverty, health, and individual survival. Individual security is a “point”, a “limit” not a “line” or a “border”. Individual security is often not a referent object for security issues. It appears at a more collective level as an aggregate of individual securities. Individual security is reduced to “human” security or to the security of the public, of the population in order to frame security into a surveillance and control logic dealing with

movement of persons and not with feelings. Individual security is seen by the institutions of coercion as a philosophical stance and not an objective. The basic elements of individual security can even be seen as forms of danger for national security (see the contradiction between juridical safety and intelligence, right of life, right against torture, and knowledge of imminent danger...or social safety and freedom to move capital... or individual safety in time of war for soldiers who need to sacrifice their lives). Individual security is then seen as a basic condition which suffers of many exceptions. The priority is the collectivity<sup>4</sup>. In the eyes of the professionals the alternative categories of safety (social justice, State of Law, multiculturalism, etc.) are dismissed and security is seen only in regards to (in)security. It creates the possibility of an established hegemony over the category of security which leads institutions towards 'softer' or 'harder' discursive and operational combinations that reproduce the conventional spectrum of the political and institutional universe. It creates debates around the function of protection of borders, over the notion of exchange of information, or even about the biometrics and the individualisation of security through technology but avoids any discussion about the right for the individual to determine security and freedom, the conflation, the distance or the balance he wants to give to each term depending on its own positioning.

Often individual security is mixed with family and friend security, especially concerning feelings and feminist research has shown how gendered was the perspective of self survival (the hobbesian model avoiding any social structure as family and children). But in the context of the institutions domestic security is often under-studied and under-theorised. The first element which is taken into account is local security. Local security is correlated with crime watch, neighbourhood watch, with urban policing, with private security companies involved in electronic surveillance, with municipal involvement, with petty crime, but also now with "born and bred" potential suspects of terrorism, with presence of foreigners. Local security is territorialised.

National security is both a concern for national criminal squads, especially in centralised countries where they may have a sort of de facto monopoly for certain specific activities such as money laundering, antiterrorist activities related to foreigners abroad.., and for the army as the national territory is considered as a sanctuary against any attacks from another army or from undeclared combatants as in the case of the discourse of the war on terror. It is the most obvious arena, linked with the idea of survival and integrity, with the metaphor of the body politics.

Collective security of the nation is considered as a key issue, different from individual security. European security is paradoxical in a way, as at such, it is often less related with collective security of all the 25 member countries than with cross border crime, translocal activities and movement of people suspected to be engaged in illegal travels or activities. Even if the second pillar has set up instruments for a collective European security (Petersberg missions, humanitarian intervention

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<sup>4</sup> The anarchist idea of individualism as both freedom and security is cut off. Collective security is needed and prioritised. State (and now market) will organise the protection of all the individuals. Individual security is the "integrale" in the leibnizian sense of all the individual securities.

abroad), Nato, as the transatlantic arena encompassing Europe, is still more influent in these domains. The third pillar has given birth to more discourses looking for crime and illegality beyond borders and trying to differentiate a specific European arena with Eurojust, the idea of a European prosecutor, with OLAF, and at a lesser degree with Europol and Interpol Europe. The refusal to have a European penal code or even a procedural code has limited the specificity of the European level which is often mixed in the discourses with a Western or transatlantic arena of “all the democracies”, especially after 11 September 2001, and the efforts of the US to become a key player inside the EU strategy of security. Transatlantic and international discourses are more oriented towards collective security in a military or human security sense. They invoked also individual security but to a lesser degree.

It is not possible to derive automatically individual and collective security from the level of the arena. It is important to look at the referent object of the discourse and it is clear that in some cases, discourses mobilise in their narrative both individual and collective arguments. Nevertheless the boundary between police activities and military activities in discourses has not disappeared, even if we have more intersubjective differences about how to draw the line. Police activities continue to refer mainly to local and individual security, military activities to collective survival. The categorisation of the priority of the fight against a threat, a risk or a danger by the agents of the field and beyond them, and the scale of these threats and risks (from local to global) are then central to analyse this axis.

The vertical axis concerning the discourses tries to differentiate between the discourses which refer to a specific zone or space to look after, and the ones which refer to a specific group of populations to watch. The vision in terms of “territory”, of a space to “protect” and to “guard” is both related with the police activities of patrolling a zone and with the army conception of the national territory as “sacred”, even if empty (see the case of remote island between Greece and Turkey, or the Falklands). The vision in terms of “traces”, of following the movement of population or even of anticipating them is different from the territorial discourse as such. Here the referent object is a population to watch for purpose of protection (the victims) or purpose of surveillance and control (the suspects, the previous offenders). The population is often categorised under specific law making processes, but sometimes contradicts it and comes only from police attitudes towards groups. It may be some individuals, it may be groups of demonstrators, it may be transnational criminal networks and supposedly global networks of terror. Often the discourse of a specific institution tries to combine the two elements of territory and population to justify its activity but the relative weight differs. Often individual and local activities are seen through the lenses of zone and space, and the collective and global activities are seen through the lenses of population on the move, with a kind of diagonal polarization, but the two axes are independent, and typically some activities as territorial wars show the difference in structures.

Nevertheless, it seems that the distribution is unequal between the four quarters if we are looking at contemporary discourses of (in)security. It seems to oppose a group of actors which insist on local



security, territory and role of frontiers as defence, sovereignty, human capacities of control, coercive logic afterwards, necessity of rules, and ethics avoiding to put too much into peril civil liberties and social cohesion. The other group of actors seems to prefer a narrative correlating global violence, global security, role of traces and surveillance of population, role of international cooperation between states, between same agencies of different countries, between all the agencies which may have an effect on security under the coordination of police and intelligence services, role of technologies, especially exchange of information through interconnected data bases, and biometrics identifiers of profiled populations, proactive vision of their work, feeling of emergency and necessity of freedom of the coercive agencies to work against the threat without constraint by the rule of law and the slowness of deliberative processes, the inevitability of a change in the trade off between security and liberty.

We have called the first ones the Classics, the second ones the Moderns (see ELISE).

To analyse precisely the statements of the different agencies, and to distribute them along these axes, we propose to look in details at their discourses and declarations (both public and private) along these criteria

1. Global violence, global security / local violence, national security
2. Traces and surveillance of people / Frontiers as zone of protection
3. European or/and International cooperation / Intergovernmental / Sovereignty argument
4. Technology as a solution / Politics as a solution
5. Preference for role of techniques / or of human capacity in technology
6. Prevention, proactivity, monitoring the future / knowledge of the past, detective attitude
7. Emergency, freedom of government and coercive institutions in the name of danger / Pre-established scenario and routines, respect of procedures
8. Exception and routinisation of the exception including a prolonged impact on civil liberties / Temporary derogations inside specific rules of law

Another criterion to correlate the narratives of the different institutions is to look at what they consider as “efficiency” and their discourse concerning the resources which need to be mobilized.

We may add their vision concerning the role of the state in “providing” security or the role of market and mixed solutions

Once we will have done the correlations of the different statements and discourses, by distributing them along the two axes, we will see if it fits with the qualitative analysis of the relations between the agencies and their mutual supports, alliances or struggles.

We will try to establish a cartography of the discourses and to look at the objective positions of the agencies to see if we can draw from that some structural homology between the social space of discursive interactions and the social space of the objective positions of the agencies.

**The social space of the institutional positions** is determined by

1. an horizontal axis which is structured along the differentiation between the **power to kill**, to decide upon life and death, as the old sovereign form of governmentality, and the power to organise and **manage life**, to coerce and protect a group or a population in order to “secure” the life of individuals by disciplinarisation or/and by specific “dispositifs” of safety and security in relation to danger and risk.
2. The vertical axis is related to the **forms of capital** of these institutions, capital constituted of economic capital (in terms of budget and of technological and human capacities), of social and relational capital (homology of structures between institutions favorising relations, link with dominant agents of other fields as the professionals of politics and of media, recognition of a legitimate authority over a specific function), of cultural capital (depending of the level of education and capacity to use a technical knowledge) and of symbolic authority related to the form of activity and the specific knowledge or know-how they have in their missions. The agents are either private or public

The osmosis with private sector priorities, rationales, and practices is highly developed in the insecurity field. A possibly promising line of introducing this thinking is the division between adaptive public institution discourses that focus on maintaining the illusion of sovereign power, and applied practices that depend almost entirely on private-sector-initiated technological design in all areas (intelligence gathering, surveillance, defence and weapons, protection of goods and premises and, increasingly, military interventions and public order maintenance). In particular, it would be significant not to miss the *framing effects* that private sector rationales and design exert on the field despite the intense screening that public actors operate in order to maintain control on discourses reaching the public. This process is even subtler in conditions of inter/supra-national cooperation and interoperability. Then we will take into account how do market forces, public institution rationales and civil society logic interact in order to favour or avert such take-overs?<sup>5</sup>

To analyse precisely the institutional positions of the different agencies, and to distribute them along these axes, we propose to look at their objective positions at the level of the services and forms of “metiers” in details along these criteria

1. economic, social and cultural capital

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<sup>5</sup> It may prove significant for the mapping to have two more questions integrated into this part:

- i. What are the main motives (market revenue, marketing purposes, media exposure, control, etc.) for absorbing or taking over the activity or the territory of another actor?
- ii. What are the risks associated with such takeovers (e.g. economic, institutional identity or profile)?

2. scale of intervention, type of missions, type of technologies
3. symbolic capital : authority, transnational relations, international formation

Concerning the level of analysis, we will divide security agencies by kind of work or métier.

It does not make sense considering the police as an homogeneous institution: the differences between the agents, their work and status remain more important than their similarities. If “work” and “services” do not exactly correspond, we will consider the service level. It is really difficult to collect precise data (budgets, personals, etc.) under this level. For example, we will separate urban polices from the criminal ones, Intelligence services from anti riots units, and so on. Our final goal is to make an analysis of the security professionals of the whole European countries, but we will begin more modestly. First, we will work on the specific level of the EU institutions, (see the last part of this deliverable). Secondly we will look at some countries (France, United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Spain) (G5), plus Benelux (Nederland, Belgium, Luxembourg), Austria (Prum Treaty) and Hungary (to have a new member state where data are available).

To give an example of the level of analysis, we will look in France to datas concerning: sécurité publique, police judiciaire, renseignements généraux, direction de la surveillance du territoire, police de l’air et des frontières, compagnies républicaines de sécurité, gendarmerie départementale, gendarmerie mobile, douanes (affaires commerciales), douanes (surveillance), direction générale à la surveillance extérieure (DGSE), direction du renseignement militaire (DRM), département de protection et de sécurité de la défense (DPSD), armée de terre, armée de l’air, marine, polices municipales, sécurité privée.

In Spain we will look at : comisaría general de seguridad ciudadana, comisaría general de policía judicial, comisaría general de información, centro nacional de información, Guardia Civil, policías de las Comunidades Autónomas (País vasco, Cataluña et Navarra, Andalucía, Galicia, Valencia et Canarias), policías locales, aduanas, seguridad privada, ejército (tierra, aire, marina).

We will create a list of all the services country by country with the help of the other Challenge teams.

We will re-organise them along the lines of their main form of activities and we will look if they are specialised or multifunctional

Social management / Community policing / Detective and Criminal investigation /Administrative investigation / Justice / Intelligence gathering / Information exchange/ Protection / Crowd control / War activities

For each service we will analyse their economic, social and relational capital, the scale of their intervention and the type of their missions, and their symbolic capital both at the national level and at the transnational level.

For each service (*i.e.* row) we will try to find and encode 38 items. This is the main task to be completed and the most difficult. Our collective experience will be very helpful, but we will need a long period as well as a series of brainstorming meetings to construct the most pertinent items. They are the core of the matrix and they will allow us to draw the social space of the institutional positions of the security professionals in order to test the correlation with their standpoints by neutralising the national-state vision or the diplomatic vision which is so often at stake when analysing the EU either along the intergovernmental model or the integrationist one. The risk of course will be on the contrary to reduce multiple correspondence by attributing symmetric or analogous positions to various national or inter-national agents. But, ideally, the multiplicity of conceptual parameters will keep distinctive structures separate and avoid confounding the dynamics in various countries and levels before the final synthesis. The archipelago of institutions across Europe should normally yield very different maps according to each set of data processing; paradoxically, that will facilitate the decision of the researchers on what are the most important unifying parameters in order to constitute a meaningful representation of the field.

Concerning the *objective data* on the economic, social and cultural capital, we will use some criteria :

- Number of agents
- Rates Number / budgets
- Rates of women
- Proportions between execution agents / executive agents / Direction agents
- Remuneration scales
- Diploma / Promotion /
- Scale of intervention and types of missions
  - \*Local /National/ Bilateral/ Multilateral/ Reinforced Collaboration inside the EU/ European Union/ European and neighbours/ Transatlantic / G8 and Western plus Australia / International –UN
  - \* Social welfare / Insurance / Education-formation/ Petty crime, urban security/ Serious crime/ Drugs / White collar crime and money laundering/ Corruption/ Organised crime/ Subversion/ Terrorism / Urban Riots/ Demonstration and upsurge/ Radicalisation/ Trafficking / Human Trafficking/ Illegal Migration / Large influx of people at borders/ Military operations of control / Military operation of surveillance / operation abroad / missions of police in peace consolidation / Humanitarian armed interventions/ Counter subversive activities and psyops/ War
- Use of Human technology (Liaison officers, police undercover, etc.) / Use of technological systems of surveillance and controls (CCTV, etc.)

For the *symbolic capital* we will look at :

- the form of authority and legitimacy: legal, political, administrative, private
- the formation to communicate with other countries (foreign language, lessons of history and culture...)
- the capacity of exchange of information with other services at the transnational level (through human or semi-automatic or automatic data-base connections)
- the nature and scale of the involvement in local security structures (neighbourhood watch programs, contrats locaux de sécurité, etc.), in national cooperation structures (antiterrorism ; organized crime) in European cooperation structures (Europol; OLAF, Fiep – Eurogendfor, ...) in international cooperation structures (Interpol, Nato, ...)
- the relations with professionals of other fields

For all these criteria the best way to complete these items, seems to elaborate a questionnaire sent to the responsible of each service, at the national level and European level. For the private security, it could be addressed to the main firms (like Securitas, which holds 50% of this market in Germany, in France, etc.). This method seems a proper answer to two sets of criticisms: that of an arbitrary interpretation of the data at hand, and that of an arbitrary selection of the interviews undertaken as part of the research project.

Independently of the difficulty to find the data, the multiplicity of criteria; the difficulty to have both a quantitative and a qualitative analysis, creates the incentive to try to use a mathematical model: a *Multiple Correspondence Analysis* (MCA).

The MCA is a correspondence analysis carried out on an indicator (or design) matrix with cases as rows and categories of variables as columns. Correspondence analysis is a descriptive, exploratory technique designed to analyze simple two-way and multi-way contingency tables containing some measure of correspondence between the rows and the columns. These methods were originally developed in France by Jean-Paul Benzecri in the early 1960's and 1970's<sup>6</sup>, and their popularity in English-speaking countries is recent.

The results provide information similar in nature to that produced by factor analysis techniques, and they allow us to explore the structure of categorical variables included in the table. In a typical correspondence analysis, a cross tabulation table of frequencies is first standardized, so that the relative frequencies across all cells sum to one. One way to state the goal of a typical analysis is to represent the entries in the table of relative frequencies in terms of the distances between individual rows and/or columns in a low-dimensional space. Assuming the  $k$ -column values in each row of the table as coordinates in a  $m$  dimensional space, we could compute the Euclidean distances between the

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<sup>6</sup> Benzecri J. P., *Analyse des données*, Paris, Dunod 1973.

$k$  row points in the  $m$ -dimensional space. The distances between the points in the  $m$ -dimensional space summarize all information about the similarities between the rows.

Afterwards we hypothesize that we would find a lower-dimensional space, in which to position the row points in a manner that retains all, or almost all, of the information about the differences between the rows. We could then present all information about the similarities between the rows (i.e., the European security agencies) in a  $m$ -dimensional graph. While this may not appear to be particularly useful for small tables, we can easily imagine how the presentation and interpretation of very large tables (e.g., differential preference for 38 items among 100 services) could greatly benefit from the simplification that can be achieved via correspondence analysis (e.g., represent the 38 agencies items in a two-dimensional space). The main advantage of this method is to give (a) mathematical evidence to the structure of the social space of institutional positions. In this case, the intuition of the main poles by the researcher is tested to construct the better differentiation by axe and they are the result of the matrix's structure<sup>7</sup>. The homology between the social position and the standpoints of the institutions is then proved by the correspondence.

A Multiple correspondence analysis is thus a very powerful tool to describe the oppositions between security agencies, and to draw a map of the field of the security professionals. But it also needs a lot of efforts to be built. Thus, it needs both precise data on each agency and a real collective thought in order to construct the useful items.

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<sup>7</sup> See Bourdieu P., « une révolution conservatrice dans l'édition », *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales* n°126-127, mars 1999 ; *La distinction. Critique sociale du jugement*, Paris, Editions de Minuit, 1979; *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste*, (trans. By Richard Nice) Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984. See also Cibois Ph., *L'analyse factorielle*, Paris, PUF 1983.

## ***Third Part : Implementing the reasoning for the EU level***

### **Specificities of the “European level”**

The aim of this paragraph is not to propose an exhaustive list of specificities of the “European level”, but rather to sketch out a few points of major relevance for the research at stake. As a preliminary remark, it seems important to underline that this level is characterised by a high degree of institutional fluctuation, due to the unfinished and undetermined nature of the European integration process. As such, it can be considered as nurturing among the actors involved in it a strong feeling of instability.

Furthermore, it is clearly tempting to establish a direct, functional connection between cooperative and competitive trends among the agents of the European (in)security field and the European integration process taking place within the EU framework. Yet, although this link does exist to some extent (e.g.: the setting-up of Europol), it is not as direct and as functional as it may seem. National police forces, for instance, have arguably been cooperating with their foreign counterparts ever since their creation: one should keep in mind the example of the initiatives that developed in Europe during the 1970s (e.g.: the TREVI group), and which were distinct from the EC institutions. The same holds true for military agencies: cooperation and competition among the various components of European armed forces have occurred in frameworks clearly separate from that of the EC/EU institutions. The two processes should however not be entirely disconnected: the aim of this project is, among others, to understand how they are articulated with each other, in particular through a process of reciprocal legitimation.

In addition, it seems important to call attention to another apparent specificity of the “European level”: the statute of the courts, both the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). Compared to the usual standing of courts in most EU countries, both the ECJ and the ECHR have a somewhat awkward position with regard to the “European level”. The ECJ is competent for all first-pillar matters, but second- and third-pillar issues are beyond its reach, including questions that are highly relevant for our concern, such as judicial and police cooperation. Furthermore, the EU has not adhered to the European Convention on Human Rights: the ECHR is therefore not competent as far as EU-level actions are concerned (although it can be seized should any Member-state be involved in human rights violations). Although the ECJ has competence for first-pillar matters, “European-level” courts are not as routinely involved in the EU’s actions as national courts would, a situation that is of high significance for liberty and security issues.

The last point of specificity regarding the “European level” is related to the question of borders. What we label as the EU is seemingly organised around a fundamental disjunction between internal and external borders, which dissimulates in fact a multiplicity of conceptions and

understandings of borders and the way they are managed. The so-called “internal” border is already a superposition of Single Market and Schengen borders. It can also be argued that internal borders are experienced differently by citizens of EU and European Economic Area (EEA) countries and third-country nationals. The same holds true for the “external border”: under this label are regrouped different border management devices, different policy narratives, and different experiences: the “external border” has a different meaning, for instance when it comes to the EU’s dealings with EEA countries, countries coming under the “neighbourhood” framework, transatlantic relations, and relations with other third countries or groups of countries. This blurring of internal and external borders is here a key point in the argument about the connection between internal and external security, between police tasks and military tasks, between the missions of each security agency at the European level and the ways in which they are evolving.

Because of these specificities, there is a significant originality to number and quality of actors we chose to regroup under the label of an European field of (in)security professionals, as shown in the next paragraph.

## **A preliminary mapping: professionals of security at the European level**

In this preliminary mapping we chose to distinguish between bodies and services. The rationale for this distinction is that it seemed difficult to focus only on the main institutions of the EU (Commission, Council and Parliament), if only because a lot is happening outside these organisations. Similarly, working only at what we labelled as the “services” level would have deprived the analysis of an overall picture of the links between these various agents. Taking on board both the “bodies” level and the “services” level allows for a fine-tuning of the analysis.

Of course, at this stage, we consider this framework to be a preliminary investigation, and expect changes both in the organisation and the number of agents. In accordance with the theoretical background provided in the first part of the deliverable, this mapping of the “European level” brings together a wide range of agencies that are often dealt with separately in the literature, some dealing with tasks traditionally identified as police or military functions (Europol, the Military Comity of the EU), others bridging this classical divide (EUROGENDFOR), some involved in the more judicial aspects of the field (both of the European courts), some again providing expertise or planning capacities (the PPEWU for instance).

We also chose to indicate those actors that were set aside, and the reason for this: in some cases, these bodies are too recent (the External Borders Agency, the EU Rapid Reaction Force, for instance), in others they can be conceived of as being at the margins of the field, their role in need of additional specification (the European Parliament, the Comity of the regions and their various commissions). These choices will be further detailed in the following pages.



## Bodies and services of the European field of (in)security: the EU level

Bodies	Services
Europol	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Serious crimes (national officers)</li> <li>- Development and research</li> <li>- Technology services</li> </ul>
Eurojust	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- College of Eurojust (25 national members)</li> <li>- Administrative services</li> </ul>
OLAF	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Administrative services (Magistrates, judicial advice and follow-up)</li> <li>- Directorate A – Policy legislation and legal affairs</li> <li>- Directorate B – Investigations and operations</li> <li>- Directorate C – Intelligence, operational strategy and information services</li> </ul>
ECJ (European Court of Justice)	Non Applicable
ECHR (European Court of Human Rights)	Non Applicable
Anti-Terrorism Coordinator	Non Applicable
EUROGENDFOR	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- CIMIN (Comité InterMinistériel de haut Niveau, strategic level)</li> <li>- EGF HQ (Operational level)</li> <li>- EGF Force (Tactical level, not a standing force)</li> </ul>
European Union Institute for Security Studies	Non Applicable
European Commission: DG Justice, Liberty and Security (JLS)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Directorate B – Immigration, Asylum and Borders</li> <li>- Directorate D – Internal Security and Criminal Justice</li> </ul>
European Commission: DG External Relations (Relex)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Directorate A – Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP): Commission coordination and contribution.</li> </ul>
General Secretariat of the European Communities : DG E (External economic relations, common foreign and security policy)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Directorate 7: European security and defence policy</li> <li>- Directorate 8: Defence aspects</li> <li>- Directorate 9: Civilian crisis management and coordination</li> </ul>
General Secretariat of the European Communities : DG H (Justice and Home Affairs)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Directorate 1: Asylum and Migration</li> <li>- Directorate 2: Police, customs and judicial cooperation</li> </ul>
High Representative for CFSP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Policy planning and early warning unit (PPEWU)</li> <li>- Military Staff</li> <li>- Joint situation centre of the European Union (SITCEN)</li> <li>- Information systems security (InfoSec)</li> <li>- High Representative Personal Representatives</li> <li>- EU Special Representatives</li> </ul>
Council of the European Union: Political and Security Committee (PSC/COPS)	Non Applicable
Council of the European Union: Military Committee of the European Union	Non Applicable
European Defence Agency (EDA)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Capability Development Directorate</li> <li>- Armaments Cooperation Directorate</li> <li>- Research and Technology Directorate</li> </ul>

	- Industry and Market Directorate
Schengen Information System II (SIS II)	- European Union Joint Supervisory Authority Schengen - SIRENE (Supplementary Information Request at the National Entry) Bureaux at the national level

The previous table does not claim to exhaust the question of the agencies of security present at the “European level”. Several complementary points are needed here. First of all, several bodies were excluded because they are too recent to be accounted for in a satisfying fashion. This comprises the External Borders Agency and the EU Rapid Reaction Force.

Other bodies, while dealing with security matters, were set aside because they can be considered as marginal to the field. Within the European Parliament, this involves several parliamentary committees: the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) and its Subcommittees on Human Rights (DROI) and on Security and Defence (SEDE), as well as the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE). The Committee of the Regions is also implicated in these questions, in particular through its Commission for External Relations. While marginal, these bodies are still pointed out because their presence raises the question of the relation between the field of the professionals of (in)security and the professionals of politics. What is also at stake here is the possibility of actors from the margin or from the outside of the field “raiding” issues either to enter the field or to draw these issues away from the field.

Finally, other bodies are connected to the “European level” of the field of (in)security, but should also be considered outside the specific framework of the EU. This includes in particular the issue of EU-NATO relations. For instance, military forces such as the EUROCORPS or the ARRC HQ (Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps Headquarters) can be used both by NATO and the EU. They can thus be used both for combat missions and missions involving the Petersberg tasks. As such, they do belong to what we have defined as the “European level” of security agencies, and are subject to the same evolutions, but they should also be studied with regard to the transatlantic dimension of the European field of (in)security. This is why they are mentioned here, without being listed as strictly belonging to the “European level”.